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A Characterization of the CPI Plutocratic Gap
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Abstract. Prais (1958) showed that the standard CPI computed by most statistical agencies can be interpreted
as a weighted average of household price indexes, where the weight of each household is determined by its
total expenditures. In this paper, we decompose the difference between the standard CPI and a democratically-
weightedindex(i.e., theCPIplutocraticgap)astheproductofexpenditureinequalityandthesamplecovariance
betweentheelementaryindividualpriceindexesandaparameterwhichisafunctionoftheexpenditureelasticity
of each good. This decomposition allows us to interpret variations in the size and sign of the plutocratic gap,
and also to discuss issues pertaining to group indexes.
Keywords. Consumer price index, plutocratic index, democratic index, group index, aggregation, equivalence
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“The answer to the question what is the Mean of a given set of magnitudes cannot in
general be found, unless there is given also the object for the sake of which a mean
value is required. There are as many kinds of averages as there are purposes; and we
may almost say in the matter of prices as many purposes as writers. Hence much vain
controversy between persons who are literally at cross purposes. To use a metaphor
which has been applied to metaphysics, one party makes a good stroke at billiards, and
thinks he has scored off another who is playing chess.” —Francis Yisidro Edgeworth
(1888), p. 346.
1. Introduction
The Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department routinely reports three consumer price
indexes, by income bracket, along with an overall consumer price index (CPI).1 CPI-A is
based on the expenditure patterns of the bottom 50 percent of the population, CPI-B uses
the next 30 percent, and CPI-C is for the next 10 percent. The composite CPI takes into
I thank Javier Ruiz-Castillo for numerous conversations and stimulating discussions on the subject
of this paper, and Mario Izquierdo for help with the computations. I received valuable comments from an
anonymous referee, Alfredo Cuevas, David S. Johnson, Marshall Reinsdorf, Rafa Repullo, Hal Varian, Shlomo
Yitzhaki, and the participants at seminars at the IMF Institute, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Bank
of Spain, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, University of Wisconsin-Madison, the XVIII Latin American
Econometric Society Meetings (July 26–28 2001, Buenos Aires), and at the CRIW/NBER workshop on Output
and Price Measurement (July 30–31 2001, Boston MA).
1 Prior to June 1999, these indexes were computed and reported by Hang Seng Bank, a private entity.
Methodological information on the elaboration of CPIs (and other economic data) can be obtained from the
IMF Data Dissemination Standard website, http://dsbb.imf.org/.
eduley@terra.esaccount the expenditure patterns of all these households taken together —which cover 90
percent of the population. For the year 2000, while inﬂation (deﬂation) measured by the
overall index was −3.7 percent, inﬂation rates of the group indexes were, respectively:
−2.8, −3.8, and −4.5 percent. Thus, differences in inﬂation rates by income group can
be quite substantial. In most countries, however, a single CPI is reported. Even when
more than one index is made available by the statistical agency, a single one is often used
as an inﬂation gauge from a macroeconomic policy perspective. How representative is,
in general, the ofﬁcial inﬂation rate, as measured by the CPI?
It is known since Prais (1958) that the CPI computed by statistical agencies can be
interpretedasaweightedaverageofhouseholdpriceindexes.2 Theweightofeachhouse-
hold is given by its total expenditure, hence the term ‘plutocratic index.’ Alternatively,
we could construct a democratically-weighted index, where each household weighs the
same. We shall deﬁne the CPI plutocratic gap as the difference between the plutocratic
index and the democratic one. Whether price behavior in a given period hurts relatively
more the better-off or the worse-off households can be expressed in terms of this single
scalar (Fry and Pashardes, 1985).
This paper investigates the sources of possible discrepancies between plutocratic and
democratic indexes.3 We show that the plutocratic gap can be expressed as the product
of a measure of variation of household expenditures, and the sample covariance between
the elementary individual price indexes and the corresponding good’s expenditure-share
regression coefﬁcient on household expenditure. This coefﬁcient, in turn, is a function
of the expenditure elasticity of each good. Consequently, because the decomposition is
multiplicative,threeelementsarerequiredforthegapbetweenplutocraticanddemocratic
indexes to exist. First, there must be some dispersion in the distribution of expenditure
across households. Second, there must be differences in patterns of expenditures by
households at different expenditure brackets. And, third, there must be differences in
behavior in prices. This paper ascribes mathematical quantities to these three elements.
The gap decomposition allows us to interpret the empirical results obtained on the size
and the sign of the plutocratic gap, and suggests that averaging the gap over long time
periods may be misleading.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents analytical results regard-
ing the plutocratic and democratic budget shares (the relation of these results with the
approximation in Prais (1958) is shown in the Appendix). Section 3 derives a charac-
terization of the CPI plutocratic gap, interprets the empirical evidence under this de-
2 J.L. Nicholson derived similar results about the same time, which were later published as Nicholson (1975).
See Diewert (1983) for a systematic exposition of results pertaining cost-of-living indexes.
3 On the welfare foundations for aggregate indexes see Pollak (1981) and Fisher (2002). Fisher (2002)
considers an inﬁnitesimal change in prices, and looks at the problem of minimizing total aggregate expenditure
subject to (i) mantaining a given level aggregate welfare, and (ii) preserving the initial distribution of nominal
household expenditures. In this framework, he shows that both democratic and plutocratic indexes can only
be justiﬁed if either (i) exact aggregation is possible, or (ii) the initial distribution of household expenditures
is considered optimal by the planner. In addition, the democratic index requires this initial distribution to be
egalitarian. In this framework a democratic index would never be justiﬁed except when it coincides with the
plutocratic index.
2composition. Section 4 presents alternative household-weighting schemes, in particular,
a demographically-weighted index —where the number of equivalent adults is used as
the household weight— which will generally lie between the democratic and plutocratic
indexes. Section 5 concludes.
2. Plutocratic and Democratic CPI budget shares
Let xh denote household-h’s total expenditures and xh
i the expenditure on good i. Then
household-h’s budget share for good i is given by sh
i = xh
i /xh, and total aggregate
expenditure is given by X =
P
xh. The plutocratic budget shares for good i in the
aggregate CPI are given by ˜ sP
i = X−1 P
h xhsh







Noting that household h individual index is given by cpih =
P
i sh
i Ii, the CPIP in (1)
maybeinterpretedasa‘representative’CPI.4 Itisnaturaltoaskthenwhatisthehousehold
better represented by the CPIP. Muellbauer (1974) searched for the household whose
budget shares were closest to the ˜ sP
i aggregate weights in the U.K. CPI, and found it
to be at the 71 percentile in the household expenditures distribution. For the U.S. in
1990, Deaton (1998) estimates that this consumer occupies the 75 percentile. Thus,
the ‘representative’ consumer embedded in (1) is inclined towards upper-expenditure
households.
Alternatively, we could use democratic budget shares, ˜ sD
i = H−1 P
h sh
i = ¯ si, where






Other obvious possibility, explored in section 4, consists in weighting each household
proportionately to the number of its members using an equivalence-scale approach.
The difference between good-i plutocratic and democratic shares in the CPI is given
by
(˜ sP











ˆ σ(x,si) = ˆ σ(x/¯ x,si)
(3)
where ¯ x = X/H is the sample mean of total expenditures, and ˆ σ(x,si) is the sample
covariance, across households, of the budget share of good i, sh
i , and the total household




pi0¯ qi, where ¯ qi is the average consumption of good i.
Consequently, at least in this sense, the CPIP is indeed the CPI of an average consumer. Similarly, by simply
multiplying the average quantities by H, we obtain that the CPIP is also the CPI of an aggregate consumer.
3expenditures (scaled by mean total household expenditures). We can now rescale the
covariance term in (3) and convert it into a regression coefﬁcient. Thus, multiplying
and dividing the right-hand side of expression (3) by the the square of the coefﬁcient of
variation of total household expenditures, we obtain:
(˜ sP
i − ˜ sD
i ) = ˆ ζ ˆ βi, (4)
where ˆ ζ = (ˆ σ2/¯ x2), and ˆ βi denotes the OLS estimator in the regression given by
(sh
i − ¯ si) = βi






Equation (4) indicates that the difference in good i’s plutocratic and democratic CPI
shares depends on the product of: (i) a measure of inequality of household expenditure,
ˆ ζ; and (ii) a measure of how good i’s budget share varies with total expenditure in
the household sample, ˆ βi. Since the decomposition is multiplicative, the shares must
coincide when there is no inequality in total expenditures or when expenditure shares are
not affected by those differences.
It is important to note that no distributional or behavioral assumption is needed to
obtain ˆ βi, because we can always estimate the regression coefﬁcient in equation (5).
Of course, if assumptions are made, then different interpretations could be given to the
parameters involved. For now, however, we simply want to stress that the decomposition
in (4) holds because of algebraic identities, and does not rely on any assumptions on
consumer behavior or household-expenditures distribution.
Note that ˆ ζ = 2I2(x), where I2(x) corresponds to the Generalized Entropy inequality
measure, Ic(x), for c = 2. The parameter c summarizes the sensitivity of Ic in different
parts of the household total expenditures distribution: the more positive (negative) c is,
the more sensitive Ic is to differences at the top (bottom) of the distribution (Cowell and
Kuga,1981). InequalityindexesbelongingtotheGeneralizedEntropyfamilyaretheonly
measures of relative inequality that satisfy the usual normative properties required for an
inequality index and, in addition, are decomposable by inequality subgroups (Shorrocks,
1984). Finally, using the fact that
P
i sh
i = 1, it follows that
P ˆ βi = 0 (so that if, for
some i, we have ˆ βi > 0 we must also have ˆ βj < 0 for some j).
3. The CPI plutocratic Gap
As discussed before, we shall deﬁne the plutocratic gap as: G ≡ (PP − PD) ÷ 100 =
(CPIP − CPID), where P = (CPI − 1) × 100 is the inﬂation rate between 0 and t (in





i − ˜ sD
i )Ii = ˆ ζ
X
i
ˆ βiIi = ˆ ζ
X
i
ˆ βi(Ii − ¯ I), (6)
where ¯ I = N−1 P
Ii is a simple average. Equation (6) may be rewritten as:
G = ˆ ζ N ˆ σ( ˆ β,I), (7)
4where ˆ σ( ˆ β,I) refers to the sample covariance of ˆ βi and Ii, this time over goods instead
that over households.
Equation (7) is our fundamental result. It shows that the plutocratic gap is determined
by the dispersion of household expenditure, measured by ˆ ζ, and the sample covariance
between ˆ βi and Ii. The sign of the plutocratic gap is determined by the covariance
term. A positive covariance term means that the goods favored by the richer households
experience higher than average inﬂation and necessities a lower than average inﬂation.
Similarly, a negative covariance implies that necessities experience higher than average
inﬂation while superior or luxury goods experience lower than average inﬂation. These
effects are also scaled by the magnitude of the inequality of household expenditures, as
measured by ˆ ζ. Ceteris paribus, the higher the dispersion in household expenditures, the
higher the size of the plutocratic gap.
Inspection of equation (7) indicates that three elements are required for the plutocratic
gap to be different from zero: (a) there must be some dispersion in the distribution of
household expenditures (reﬂected by ˆ ζ 6= 0); (b) there must be some observed differences
in consumption patterns among households with different total expenditures (reﬂected
by ˆ βi 6= 0 for some i); and (c) there must be some differences in price behavior across
some goods which display behavioral differences across households (reﬂected by Ii 6= ¯ I
for some i which has ˆ βi 6= 0). These three conditions are necessary for G 6= 0, and if they
all hold we must have G 6= 0 —i.e., they are also jointly sufﬁcient.
In practical situations, however, not all households face the same prices. For each
good i, the statistical agency collects j prices, pijt, one for each geographical area j.
This can be readily accommodated within the present analysis by thinking of item i in
different areas as different goods. We would expand the good space to include N × J
goods. As a result, sh
i will be always zero for the ‘goods’ outside the geographical area
where household h resides. All the previous analysis applies without further changes.
3.1. Empirical Estimates of the CPI plutocratic Gap
Table 1 summarizes the main ﬁndings of various empirical studies that have estimated
the plutocratic gap for different countries during various time periods.5 Care must be
applied to cross-country comparisons because the range of publicly-provided goods (e.g.,
health care or housing) varies widely across countries.
Given a household survey, ˆ ζ and the ˆ βi’s are then ﬁxed, and any source of variation
in the sign and size of the gap for, e.g., each year must be solely explained by the price
behavior reﬂected by the Ii’s. The movements in the Ii’s may cause ˆ σ( ˆ β,I) to change
sign from one year to another (Table 2 below). Thus, as noted, looking at the overall G,
simply averaging over a long period may be misleading.
5 We are unable to provide estimates sampling variability for the different inﬂation rates because elementary
price data is not publicly available. For Spain, the sampling variability of household expenditure shares would
imply uncertainty well to the right of the third decimal of annual inﬂation rates expressed as percentages.
However, the variability from price sampling is likely to outweight the variability due to the household shares.
For the U.S., the best estimates for the standard error of inﬂation rates (expressed as percentages) is of the order
of 0.06 to 0.1; see Leaver and Valiant (1995) and Leaver and Cage (1997).
5Table 1. Empirical Studies of the CPI plutocratic Gap
Range (percentage points per year)
Country Time Period N PP G
Carruthers et al. (1980) U.K. 1975–78 11 8.2 to 24.2 −0.1
Fry and Pashardes (1985) id. 1974–82 95 8.2 to 24.2 negative
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) id. 1975–76 10 14.5 −2
Crawford (1996) id. 1979–92 74 3.4 to 18.0 +0.16
Newbery (1995) id. 1980s 87 3.4 to 18.0 slightly positive
ibid. Hungary 1980s 87 4.5 to 16.9 slightly positive
Kokoski (1987) U.S. 1972–80 146 3.3 to 13.5 −0.1 to −0.3
Erbas and Sayers (1998) id. 1986–95 7 1.9 to 5.4 negative
Garner et al. (1999) id. 1980s 207 1.9 to 13.5 slightly negative
Kokoski (2000)† id. 1987–97 146 2.0 to 5.25 −0.28 to +0.56
L´ odola et al. (2000) Argentina 1989–91 9 220 to 10,781 +2.3 to +663.4
ibid. id. 1991–93 9 11.2 to 20.0 −0.66 to −0.78
ibid. id. 1993–98 9 1.2 to 3.3 −0.48 to +0.65
Yahav and Yitzhaki (1991) Israel 1960–71 10 1.99 to 12.06 −0.12 to +0.25
ibid. id. 1981–86 28 19.9 to 373.8 −1.7 to +6.3
Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2003) Spain 1973–81 57 14.54 to 23.02 −0.04 to +0.53
ibid. id. 1981–91 58 4.59 to 9.48 −0.19 to +0.30
ibid. id. 1991–98 2,042 2.49 to 6.99 −0.08 to +0.15
Source: Studies cited, IMF Government Financial Statistics and author’s calculations.
† This paper has a typo in its Table 2: the column headings “Democratic” and “Plutocratic” should be switched.
Because of data limitations, most of the results in Table 1 are based on a substantially
smallernumberofgoodsthanthenumberforwhichpriceswerecollectedbythestatistical
agencies(columnN). Inparticular,moststudiesdonothaveinformationongeographical
price variation, they assume that the same national average CPI prices apply to all
households in the sample, and focus on the effect of expenditure shares variability across
households. Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2003), uses 2,042 goods for the 1990s (see below), but
only 58 and 57 for the 1980s and 1970s.As a result, working with highly aggregated
goods causes an underestimation of the true plutocratic gap for two reasons. First, price
aggregates already embody a plutocratic gap. Second, expenditure elasticities revert to
the mean (i.e., to one) as we aggregate goods. As a result, the true size of the plutocratic
gap is underestimated.6
For Spain during the 1990s, Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2003) estimate that the average
plutocratic gap in Spain amounts to 0.055 percent per year.7 However, as shown in Table
6 Algebraically, in equation (6), the ﬁrst effect implies that the Ii’s are artiﬁcially close to CPIP. The
second effect implies that the ˆ βi’s are artiﬁcially close to zero. The end result is that the size of σ(ˆ β,I) shrinks
towards zero, producing an underestimation of the true plutocratic gap, G.
7 The results in Table 2 are based on the Spanish household budget survey collected by the Spanish statistical
62, annualgapsaretypicallylarger, andpricemovementssigniﬁcantlychangethesignand
magnitudeoftheannualgap. TheresultsinTable2arebasedon21×18+32×52 = 2,042
different Iij’s; 21 food goods in 18 autonomous communities and 32 non-food goods in
52 provinces.8
Table 2. Decomposition of the CPI plutocratic Gap: Spain 1993–97
(All values in percentage points)
PP PD ˆ ζ N ˆ σ( ˆ β,I) G
1993 5.271 5.165 0.496 0.212 0.105
1994 4.621 4.701 0.496 -0.161 -0.080
1995 4.079 4.130 0.496 -0.101 -0.050
1996 3.180 3.090 0.496 0.181 0.090
1997 2.494 2.369 0.496 0.252 0.125
¯ x = 2.56E+6, ˆ σ = 1.81E+6, N = 2,042
Thus, as discussed above, the sign and magnitude of the gap may vary signiﬁcantly
year after year, even when using the same budget survey. As a result, ﬁnding the
gap small during one particular period has little bearing over its size and sign at other
time when prices may behave differently. For different household surveys, not only
the price dynamics may change, but also expenditure inequality may be different (e.g.,
ˆ ζ was 2% larger for Spain in 1980–81). As a result, ﬁndings for one country may
have little implications for other countries with larger income inequality and different
price dynamics. For instance, income inequality in Latin America is very large, IDB
(1998) reports that countries in the region experience the largest income inequality in
the World. It is very likely then that the CPI plutocratic gap be of a larger signiﬁcance
in Latin America, especially in countries with double-digit inﬂation that may have more
differentiatedpricedynamics. Itiscommonintheregiontoexcludrthericherhouseholds
—e.g., the CPI weights in Ecuador are computed because of the ‘large dispersion in their
consumption patterns.’ (In the U.K., the index weight calculation excludes the top 4%
of the population by income and also pensioners mainly dependent on state beneﬁts.)
Nonetheless, in Ecuador, as is typically done in many countries (including the U.S.), the
household survey on which the CPI is based is restricted to urban areas.
agency 1990–91. This is a household budget survey of 21,155 household sample points, representative of a
population of approximately 11 million households and 38 million persons occupying residential housing in all
of Spain. The survey was collected from April 1990 to March 1991.
8 The statistical agency collects elementary price indexes for a commodity basket consisting of 471 items
in 130 municipalities spread over the 52 Spanish provinces under the CPI present system, based in 1992.
Approximately 150,000 prices are collected each month from approximately 29,000 establishments. Price
information at this disaggregated level is not publicly available. Prices are generally collected once a month at
eachestablishment, exceptforperishableitemswhicharecollectedthreetimesamonthfromallestablishments.
7While the Hong Kong indexes mentioned in the introduction are obtained by simple
reweighting, there are instances where statistical agencies make an effort to adequately
address these two issues. The Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implemen-
tation computes four different CPIs: CPI-IW, CPI-RL, CPI-AL, and CPI-UNME. The
CPI-IWcovershouseholdsheadedbyindustrialworkersin70industrialcentersfollowing
260 items and sampling approximately 160,000 retail price quotes from 16,545 outlets
and selected open markets. The CPI-RL covers all rural households and it is compiled
for 20 states and for all India, covering 85 to 106 items; 61,005 monthly price quotes are
collected from retail outlets in 600 villages. The CPI-AL, similar to the RL, except that
it covers only households headed by agricultural laborers. Finally, the CPI-UNME cov-
ers households headed by non-manual workers in 59 urban centers sampling 1022 price
quotesonavaryingnumberofitemsdependingonthecenter,from146inImphalto345in
Delhi. Inﬂation rates may differ signiﬁcantly for these indexes. For instance, in January
2001, the annual inﬂation rates were 3.3, −2.0, −1.6, and 5.8 percent, respectively.
4. Alternative Weighting Schemes
For any family of household weights, ωh(θ), parametrized by θ, we can deﬁne ˜ si(θ) = P
h ωh(θ)sh
i , and construct CPI(θ) =
P
i ˜ si(θ)Ii. Deﬁning G(θ) = (CPIP − CPI(θ))
leads to the following generalization of equation (7):
G(θ) = N {ˆ ζ ˆ σ( ˆ β,I) − ˆ ξ(θ) ˆ σ(ˆ δ(θ),I)} =
X
i
{ˆ σ(x/¯ x,si) − ˆ σ(ω(θ)/¯ ω(θ),si)} Ii (8)
where ˆ ξ is the inequality index applied to ωh(θ), and ˆ δi(θ) is the OLS estimate of the
regression of ˜ si(θ) on ωh(θ)/¯ ω(θ).
As suggested by Nicholson (1975), instead of weighting equally each household, an
alternative approach is to consider explicitly the number of members in each household
using an equivalence-scale approach. Equivalence scales are used in empirical studies of
consumption behavior to take into account economies of scale in household composition.
Following Buhmann et al. (1988) we could adopt an equivalence scale model in which
scale economies in consumption depend only on household size. Let nh be the number
of members of household h; then ωh(θ) ∝ (nh)θ, with θ ∈ [0,1], can be interpreted as
the number of ‘equivalent adults’ in a household of size nh. We have ωh(0) = 1
H, which
would weight each household equally as in our democratic index. At the other extreme,
ωh(1) ∝ nh would simply represent the number of members for a super-democratic
index. Weighting households by the number of equivalent adults will generally push the
index towards to the plutocratic index.
The top panel in table 3 shows G(θ) for different values of θ, for Spain in the 1990s,
when ωh(θ) ∝ (nh)θ. The magnitude of the gap decreases with θ. Moreover, there is
even a sign reversal, for 1995, with G(1) > 0 while for all other values of θ the gap,
G(θ), is negative. The results in Table 3 are a consequence of the fact that, as it is to
be expected, for Spain, in that time period, household size and total expenditure are
correlated. Nonetheless, even for θ = 1, the size of the gaps in Table 3 is not negligible.
8Table 3. Alternative Aggregation Schemes: Spain 1993–97
(All values in percentage points)
Equivalence-Scale Weighting: ωh(θ) ∝ (nh)θ
G(θ)
PP θ = 0 θ = 0.25 θ = 0.50 θ = 0.75 θ = 1
1993 5.271 0.105 0.098 0.090 0.083 0.077
1994 4.621 -0.080 -0.065 -0.052 -0.042 -0.034
1995 4.079 -0.050 -0.033 -0.018 -0.004 0.009
1996 3.180 0.090 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.085
1997 2.494 0.125 0.121 0.117 0.113 0.110
Equivalent Household Expenditures: ωh(θ) ∝ xh/(nh)θ
G(θ)
PP θ = 0 θ = 0.25 θ = 0.50 θ = 0.75 θ = 1
1993 5.271 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.013
1994 4.621 0.000 -0.009 -0.020 -0.034 -0.050
1995 4.079 0.000 -0.010 -0.020 -0.032 -0.045
1996 3.180 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.010
1997 2.494 0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.014
Muellbauer Homogeneous Social Weights: ωh(θ) ∝ (xh)(1−θ)
G(θ)
PP θ = 0 θ = 0.25 θ = 0.50 θ = 0.75 θ = 1
1993 5.271 0.000 0.027 0.053 0.080 0.105
1994 4.621 0.000 -0.015 -0.033 -0.055 -0.080
1995 4.079 0.000 -0.007 -0.017 -0.032 -0.050
1996 3.180 0.000 0.023 0.045 0.067 0.090
1997 2.494 0.000 0.029 0.060 0.091 0.125
Anotherpossibleweightingschemecouldbebasedonequivalenthouseholdexpenditures,
ωh(θ) ∝ xh/mh(θ), which results in the plutocratic index for θ = 0 (second panel of
table 3).
Finally, Muellbauer (1974) proposes a class of homogeneous social price indexes
parameterized by a measure of aversion to inequality, θ ∈ [0,1]. The household weights
are now proportional to (xh)(1−θ), which reduces to democratic weights when θ = 1,
and plutocratic weights when θ = 0. Table 3 shows the gaps for this aggregating scheme
with respect to the plutocratic CPI. It is interesting to focus on the polar cases. Both
indexes coincide with the plutocratic Laspeyres when θ = 0, so the corresponding gap is
zero. ThelastcolumnfortheMuelbaueraggregationschemecorrespondstoademocratic
index —i.e., it coincides with ﬁrst column in the top panel.
95. Concluding Remarks
What is the appropriate inﬂation gauge from a macroeconomic perspective? How should
weadjust,e.g.,taxbrackets,publicpensions,orsocialprogramstransfersannually?9 BLS
(1997, p. 172) warns “CPI users should understand that the CPI may not be applicable
to all questions about price movements for all population groups.” Nevertheless, in most
places and in most times, these quantities are invariably revised according to a plutocratic
CPI. Thus, a dollar-weight logic prevails over a household-weight logic.
Escalating transfer payments by the plutocratic CPI may result in over- or under-
compensation relative to a democratic index during different time periods. While these
deviations may tend to cancel off over longer horizons, there is, however, an important
perversity emphasized by Ruiz-Castillo et al. (2003). The plutocratic gap in the CPI
often accentuates the change in household welfare rather than smoothing it. In effect, the
worse-off households suffer under-adjustments when inﬂation is more harmful to them
—i.e., when they can least afford it. In periods where the plutocratic gap is negative
(when prices behave in an way more detrimental to the poorer households) then social
programs, which primarily beneﬁt the poor, are revised less than what would be the case
with a democratic group index. Similarly, when price movements are less detrimental
to the poorer households —i.e., when the plutocratic gap is positive— indexed social
transfers grow more than cost-of-living adjustments would dictate. Thus, plutocratic-CPI
adjustments display harmful ‘procyclical’ features.10
Nonetheless,theplutocraticCPIhasitsownmerits. Itnaturallyariseswhencomputing
the aggregate Laspeyres price index, and it is consistent with aggregate deﬂators arising
from the national accounts. It also provides an upper bound for the theoretical aggregate
compensating variation (Hicks, 1940) —i.e., by how much would monetary national
income need increase to compensate for a price variation. Plutocratic weights would also
arise if we were to draw prices at random in such a way that each dollar of expenditure
had an equal chance of being selected (Theil, 1967; p. 136).
While different indexes could be easily computed for different uses, Prais (1958,
p. 131) asked: Can more than one index numbers be tolerated without confusion? There
is a crucial tradeoff between the simplicity of the current prevailing one-size-ﬁts-all ap-
proach and the conceptual superiority of a piecemeal-menu approach to index numbers.
The best resolution may well vary in different places and at different times. This paper
showsthatthelargertheincome(expenditure)inequality,themoredifferenttheconsump-
tion patterns by income group, and the larger the variance in individual price behavior,
the less appealing is a single plutocratic CPI as the only policy adjuster. Finally, if a
9 See Triplett (1983), Fry and Pashardes (1985), Griliches (1995), Pollak (1998), and Jorgenson and Slesnick
(1999).
10 For the richer households, since the plutocratic index is always closer to their true index than a democratic
one, this problem is unlikely to be too important. However, CPI adjustments also display procyclicality.
Possibly the most important CPI adjustment involving the richer households involves the revision of income-
tax brackets. In this case, when inﬂation is more detrimental to the richer households, the plutocratic CPI will
be below the true inﬂation of the rich, and they would pay too much in taxes. Conversely, they will pay too
little when inﬂation is less detrimental to them.
10single index number is to be computed, then as Prais (1958, p. 126) asked: Whose cost
of living should one have in mind?
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